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CLIMATE CHANGE AND CAUSATION: JOINING LAW AND
CLIMATE SCIENCE ON THE BASIS OF FORMAL LOGIC
Petra Minnerop† and Friederike Otto††
I. INTRODUCTION
A strict application of legal tests to find the cause of an event,
combined with a traditional emphasis on finding the necessary cause
in a counterfactual inquiry and a judicial demand of certainty, sets a
high threshold for making causal statements. Often, this threshold of
the “but for” test has been found to be over-exclusionary.1 In the
context of climate change, the emerging field of probabilistic event
attribution provides significant information to explain past events and
to forecast future events related to anthropogenic climate change.2
This field of climate science focuses on making robust statements
about the role of climate change, quantifying changes in the likelihood of extreme weather events and attributing these to greenhouse
gas (“GHG”) emissions or even certain emitters. For example, one
† Lecturer at the University of Dundee, School of Social Sciences, Law; Visiting
Lecturer, China University of Politics and Law, Beijing.
†† Associate Professor and Acting Director of the Environmental Change
Institute, University of Oxford.
1

Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC (HL) 32
(“On occasions the threshold ‘but for’ test of causal connection may be overexclusionary. Where justice so requires, the threshold itself may be lowered. In
this way the scope of a defendant’s liability may be extended.”); see also March v
Stramare (E & MH) (1991) 171 CLR 506 (“[there are] convincing reasons
precluding its adoption as a comprehensive definitive test of causation in the law
of negligence.”).
2
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 1(2), Mar. 21,
1994, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (defining climate change as a “change of climate which
is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of
the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability
observed over comparable time periods.”); UNITED NATIONS INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SPECIAL REPORT: GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C
544 (2018) (referring to climate change as “a change in the state of the climate that
can be identified . . . by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties
and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer.”).
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study looking at the Argentina 2013–2014 heatwave found that this
event was made five times more likely due to total anthropogenic
emissions and attributed thirty seven percent of that probabilistic
increase to GHG emissions of the European Union.3
Given that climate scientists are now able to make robust
statements quantifying the likelihood of extreme weather events in
changing climate conditions, does this allow us to make causal
inferences, ultimately ascertaining responsibility in law? We argue
that the traditional “but for” or “conditio sine qua non” inquiries
used to establish causal relations are inadequate to develop legally
meaningful causal explanations in the climate change context. However, a coherent approach to causal analysis is possible within a
matrix we introduce. While not attempting to offer a full philosophically rooted, universal model of a theory on causality,4 we expose
some criteria that the law uses to test causation in the hope to subject
these to a much needed discussion of climate change and causation
which will affect international law, domestic law, and climate science. Our matrix is based on the observation that in different categories of cases outside climate change, courts occasionally soften
the legal concept of causation to recognize fairness considerations
when differentiating mere co-relation from cause and effect. These
normative judgments govern the measure of damages recoverable in
tort law and in contract law.5
3

Friederike E.L. Otto et al., Assigning Historic Responsibility for Extreme
Weather Events, 7 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 757, 758 (2017).
4
See MICHAEL STREVENS, DEPTH: AN ACCOUNT OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 6
(2008); Wesley C. Salmon, Statistical Explanation, in ROBERT G. COLODNY, THE
NATURE AND FUNCTION OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES 173 (1970); PATRICK SUPPES, A
PROBABILISTIC THEORY OF CAUSALITY 12 (1970); MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS AND METAPHYSICS 3
(2009). We will not focus on the Bayesian interpretation of probability; for an
introduction into the Bayesian theorem, see JUDEA PEARL, CAUSALITY 2 (2d ed.
2009); For an excellent discussion of the use of the Bayesian theorem and
probabilities in jurisprudence see Adam Perry, Strained Interpretations (Feb. 11,
2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3175410.
5
Ernest J Weinrib, Causal Uncertainty, 36 OJLS 135, 140 (2016), draws the
attention to conceptual operations in handling causal uncertainty in accordance
with corrective justice; Emmanuel Voyiakis, Causation and Opportunity in Tort,
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However, this article does not focus on the normative dimension of legal causation, where the outcome of cases is adjusted if the
mechanistic application of the “but for” test yields unfair results.
These cases are only used as examples to demonstrate that a strict
causal tests is not consistently upheld, that instead courts are prepared to comply with demands of fairness and justice. Accordingly,
these exceptional cases are discussed with a view to tracing three
major challenges that this approach entails for making coherent causal inferences in the climate change context. As a special case in
point for climate litigation, the decision of the Essen Court of First
Instance (Landgericht Essen) in Lluiya v RWE is used to demonstrate
that a mechanistic application of causal tests will remain insufficient.6
For the analytical part of this paper, we then concentrate on
developing a novel matrix for causal explanations in the climate
change context. The focus in that part rests on the logical fundamentals of legal causation, represented by the existing elements of necessity and sufficiency and, as will be explained and discussed in detail,
a new element: sustenance. Sustenance is defined as the capacity of a
factor to protect or maintain an effect despite certain structural

38 OJLS 26, 28 (2018) explores and extends Hart’s and Scanlon’s insights about
the justificatory significance of alternative options; for the differentiation between
statistic and causal inferences, see Richard W Wright, Causation, Responsibility,
Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1001 (1988); Patrick Shaunessy, A matter of
choice: rethinking legal formalism’s account of private law rights, 37 OJLS 163
(2017); further on the explanatory power of economic analysis: WILLIAM LANDES
& ERIC POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 23 (Harvard 1987);
Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry
Kalven Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69 (1975); Richard Epstein, Causation and Corrective Justice: A Reply to Two Critics, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 477 (1970); Joseph Gardner, What is tort law for? Part 1: the place of corrective justice, 30 LAW & PHIL. 1
(2011); Gregory Mitchell & Philip Tetlock, An empirical inquiry into the relation
of corrective justice to distributive justice, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 421
(2006).
6
Landgericht Essen [District Court Essen] Dec. 15, 2016, 2 O 285/15 (Ger.).
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changes in the model.7 With this matrix, the article provides some
groundwork that can be used in future judicial reasoning, especially
if courts establish themselves as “cooperative courts,” where “specific judgements will make novel and eminently compelling statements
that a resonate in courts in other jurisdictions.”8 However, its potential use goes beyond litigation, as certainty on the threshold requirements of legally meaningful causal connections is an important prerequisite for identifying and presenting relevant scientific evidence
and using this evidence not only in courts but also for advancing
international and domestic law which is designed to managing
climate change.9
The main argument we develop is as follows. There is sufficient robust evidence to establish a strong causal connection between
historic and future anthropogenic GHG emissions, an increase in the
global mean surface temperature and the severity and frequency of
certain individual severe weather and climate related events. To capture this evidence, we introduce the term “distinctive causal field.”
This term thus denotes a strong causal connection between anthropogenic emissions and an increase in the likelihood and intensity of
classes10 (or types) of extreme events.
7

PEARL supra note 4, at 309, 316, 317; The element of sustenance, including the
mathematical formula that expresses it and underlies the analysis, will be
discussed in detail in 3.3.
8
Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The strategic Uses of Foreign and
International Law by National Courts, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 241, 251 (2008). A
good example of this mechanism is the order of the Australian Land and Environment Court with references to the Urgenda decision of The Hague Court of
Appeal, see Gloucester Resources Limited v Minister for Planning [2019]
NSWLEC 7 (Austl.); for the Dutch Judgment, see The State of the Netherlands v
Urgenda Foundation 200.178.245/01 (9 Oct. 2018) ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2018:
2610 (unofficial English translation); for a discussion, see Petra Minnerop,
Integrating the ‘Duty of Care’ under the European Convention on Human Rights
and the Science and Law of Climate Change: the Decision of The Hague Court of
Appeal in the Urgenda Case, 37 J. ENERGY & NAT. RES. L. 149, 174 (2019).
9
1/CP.21 UN FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add. 1, Paris Agreement, Article 2(2).
10
An example of a class of events is a heat wave at least as hot, or hotter, than the
one observed in 2014 defined over the whole country of Argentina; A class of
events is thus not a singular event but all the events that lead to similar or worse
impacts in a certain geographical area or sector.
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Probabilistic event attribution is used to present the evidence
for specific extreme events that can be attributed to certain emitters.
Based on formal logic, we open the legal concept to scientific findings where a concrete climate impact can be attributed to a specific
emitter.11 This is achieved by introducing the property of “sustenance” with which Judea Pearl—known for his theory of causal and
counterfactual inference based on structural models—has revolutionised our understanding of causation across scientific and sociolegal research.12 Sustenance is used where the logical elaborations of
necessity and sufficiency alone are inadequate to fully capture
cause-quality in law. It is a key notion to make causal inferences
within our matrix. In the context of climate change, and potentially
beyond,13 this additional property accounts for components of a set
of conditions which can be concurrent causes. The argument is developed in three parts, followed by a conclusion.
Beginning with an explanation of our use of the terms
“cause” and “concurrent cause” in Part I, we briefly present some
specific categories of cases where the traditional tests for causation
11

Formal logic is understood here in a mathematical sense, where mathematical
techniques and laws (such as the transitivity theory) are used to develop a valid
legal argument. For a definition of logic, see ELLIOTT MENDELSON, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL LOGIC xv–xix (6th ed. 2015); see also PATRICK SUPPES,
INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC xviii, 253 (1964). Semantics or logical syntax are terms
used by philosophers to denote a structured and formalised mathematical theory
(metamathematics). The use of formal logic is based on the understanding that the
concept of causation in law is indeterminate and this cannot be resolved by legal
interpretation alone, see Judea Pearl, Causes of Effects and Effects of Causes, 44
SOC. METHODS & RES. 149, 152 (2015); see David W. Robertson, The Common
Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1765 (1997). Sometimes further criteria
must be added to resolve legal indeterminacy; see Thomas Endicott, Interpretation
and Indeterminacy: Comments on Andrei Marmor’s Philosophy of Law 10 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 46 (2014). The complexity of a societal problem can be
addressed through adding further connecting elements within a given system, see
NIKLAS LUHMAN, DIE GESELLSCHAFT DER GESELLSCHAFT 137, 996 (1998).
12
PEARL, supra note 4, at 316, 317.
13
The claim that the legal argument is well reasoned can be limited to a particular
legal order or a legal concept constituting the referential framework, however, a
more general claim that the legal argument is reasonable beyond this partial
framework is not excluded, see ROBERT ALEXY, THEORIE DER JURISTISCHEN
ARGUMENTATION 351 (1986).
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have failed and prompted normative adjustments. We introduce the
case Lluiya v. RWE as a specific case in point to demonstrate three
main constraints that the current causal inquiry entails in climate
litigation. Part II explains the recent developments and the methods
in the field of probabilistic event attribution. This part explains how
scientists establish specific evidence that relates the fraction of the
attributable increase in the occurrence frequency and intensity of
individual extreme weather and climate related (slow onset) events
to certain emitters.14 Part III joins law and climate science and introduces a thorough discussion of the criteria of necessity, sufficiency
and sustenance, including previous attempts to systemically capture
concurrent causes in law. We then introduce our proposal of a new
matrix for causal explanations in the climate change context. This
rests on three pillars, each of them addressing one of the main constraints of the current causal tests. The new matrix thus remains
firmly based on the existing counterfactual inquiry but uses an
extended logical basis. This allows us to reconcile probabilistic attribution and the various confidence levels which attach to the evidence, for causes that are at least concurrent causes, in a coherent
concept of causation in law.15
II. THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR CAUSAL ANALYSIS
Despite the fact that differences in the law apply across jurisdictions, the core idea of any causal explanation in law is that mere
co-relations between factors can be distinguished from mechanisms

14

Slow onset events include the temperature increase, sea level rise, desertification, glacial retreat and related impacts, ocean acidification, land and forest
degradation, salinization and loss of biodiversity.
15
This contributes to the role of law in addressing climate change. The UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights identified climate change as
a threat to the rule of law and democracy, Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty
and Human Rights, Visit to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, ¶ 65, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/41/39 (June 25, 2019); Elisabeth Fisher & Eloise
Scotford, Climate Change Adjudication: The Need to Foster Legal Capacity: An
Editorial Comment 18 J. ENVTL. L. 3,4 (2016).
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that cause one factor to produce another.16 We understand the term
“cause” as such factor that can produce an event, without preselecting a deterministic or probabilistic relation between the factor
and the event that follows.17 Conversely, the term is used in a wider
sense to explain that an event has been produced and a factor will
qualify as “cause” of this event if it has at least increased the probability of the event’s occurrence in a statistically significant way.18
On that basis, a “concurrent cause” is defined as “an act or event or
a state of nature which initiates or permits … in conjunction with
other causes a sequence of events resulting in an effect.”19 This
captures factors that form part of a set of conditions and multi-stage
scenarios where a chain of factors lead to an event.
Across most legal systems,20 and despite many differences
across jurisdictions which cannot be discussed in detail here, the
core test for causation follows a bifurcated approach.21 The first
limb is factual causation, where a counterfactual inquiry seeks to
identify the factor that was necessary or sufficient for the event. The
16

STREVENS, supra note 4, at 7. Causal explanations thus differ from statistical
explanations, see Salmon, supra note 4, at 173; SUPPES, supra note 4, at 12.
17
Ernest Sosa, Varieties of Causation, in CAUSATION 234 (Ernest Sosa & Michael
Tooley eds. 1993).
18
STREVENS, supra note 4, at 7, 8.
19
Kenneth J Rothman, Causes, 201 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 587, 588 (1976). The
term concurrent cause is thus used here in line with judgment in the case Certain
Activities carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.),
Judgment, 2018 I.C.J. REP. (Feb. 2) (using the term concurrent cause where the
ICJ for the first time in its history adjudicated compensation for environmental
damage).
20
H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 100, 108, 431 (1985)
(2nd ed. OUP 1985); Desmond M. Clarke, Causation and Liability in Tort Law, 5
JURISPRUDENCE 217 (2014). We do not claim to give a complete comparative
analysis, the following only demonstrates the approach where a strict causal test is
coupled with making normative adjustments. For a recent discussion of different
theories pertaining to tort law, see John Murphy, The Heterogeneity of Tort Law,
29 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 455 (2019).
21
See CAUSATION IN EUROPEAN TORT LAW 4, 590 (Marta Infantino & Eleni
Zervogianni eds. 2017); WALTER VAN GERVEN ET AL., NATIONAL, SUPRANTIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL TORT LAW 395 (2000); Margaret Beazley, Damage, in
FLEMING’S THE LAW OF TORTS 225, 227 (Carolyn Sabbideen & Prue Vines eds.,
10th ed. 2011).
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second limb is finding the legally relevant cause. This involves normative considerations,22 to establish which factor was relevant and
which was not, or not to the same extent, and to elude the strictness
of a mechanistic application of the test. In the next section, we trace
some of the legal developments where the strictness of the causal
analysis is coupled with normative correctives, along with the challenges that this presents to a coherent concept of causation. This section demonstrates that our approach is not as radical as it may seem
at first instance. It ties in with the observation that pragmatic judicial
reasoning surrounds the quest for causal explanations in cases where
justice demands a deviation from a strict approach.
A. Resolving the Harshness of “But For” and “Conditio Sine
Qua Non”—Examples Outside Climate Change
The “but for” test derived from tort law asks whether the
harm would have occurred but for the action concerned? The “conditio sine qua non” test which is most familiar to the lawyer from a
civil law tradition seeks to define the causal link based on similar
counterfactual considerations. Both approaches claim to establish a
causal link from a logical-scientific perspective. Using a counterfactual inquiry, the cause-quality of a factor is assessed by a process of
elimination of the relevant factor in mind.23 Consequently, every
cause, that cannot be thought to be non-existent without omitting the
event in question, is considered to be a factual cause.
Under the limb of legal causation, normative correctives are
then applied to identify the factor that not only was necessary for the
result as factual cause but is also different from other factors or mere
circumstances which are not included in the consideration of the
causal chain.24 However, normative correctives are also applied to
22

GERVEN ET AL., supra note 21, at 395.
Id. at 443.
24
MOORE, supra note 4, at 118; Jane Stapleton, Choosing What We Mean by
“Causation” in the Law, 73 MO. L. REV. 433, 455 (2008); JOHN S. MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC: RATIOCINATIVE AND INDUCTIVE VOLUME 1 365 (2011) (“it is very
common to single out one only of the antecedents under the denomination of
Cause, calling the others merely Conditions.”).
23
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find the cause in exceptional cases where a strict test of causation
would contravene law’s consideration of fairness and justice.25 The
following section briefly explores some examples of this approach
used in the area of the law of torts, thereby considering aspects of
procedural law and substantive law that incorporate normative determinations.
Allocating the burden of proof, setting the threshold of certainty to distribute risks, and shifting the burden of proof, are normative determinations for which the procedural law can account.26
Generally, “but for” causation in the common law of torts entails
that a claimant must prove that there was more than a fifty percent
chance that the breach of the duty caused the harm.27 In other words,
the action may not be the only factor that causes the type of harm
but in the specific situation it must have been the most likely one.28
The “conditio sine qua non” test used in civil law jurisdictions does
not comprise a clear numerical threshold but requires that the court
is convinced that a causal link exists.29 Courts may also apply normative correctives which result in shifting the burden of proof,30 or
allow the claimant to prove only a substantial increase of the risk

25

Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact 9 STAN. L REV. 60, 64 (1956);
Richard W Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1735, 1743 (1985).
26
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §§ 26, 441 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
27
KRISTY HORSEY & ERIKA RACKLEY, TORT LAW 249 (5th ed. 2017) 249.
28
Wilsher v. Essex Area Health Auth. [1988] AC 1074, 1091 (HL); Bonnington
Castings Ltd. v. Wardlaw [1956] AC 613 (HL).
29
Grundsatz der freien Beweiswürdigung (principle of independent judicial
evaluation of evidence), see HEINZ THOMAS & HANS PUTZO, ZIVILPROZEßORDNUNG (25th ed. 2003) § 286; Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice]
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2000, 953.
30
In the Mesothelioma cases, a normatively modified approach to factual causation was established for every single instance of exposure to asbestos in consecutive employments that preceded the harm and increased its risk, even if it was not
possible to prove through which specific situation of exposure to asbestos the
injury (Mesothelioma) occurred. This results in a reversal of the onus of proof,
where the defendant has to rebut the assumption that his action increased the risk,
with the increase in risk being treated as the damage.
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which eventually led to the harm if a material contribution to the
harm itself cannot be proven.31
The main category of cases where the outcome of a strict
causal analysis is adjusted on the basis of normative considerations
consists of concurrent causes in multi-stage scenarios or variations of
cumulative causation. In these cases, none of the causes on their own
would satisfy the “but for” test or the theory of equivalent causation
under the “conditio sine qua non” formula. This could be either in a
situation of alternative sufficient causation where other single factors32 or a set of factors could have led to the same event33 or in a
case where all factors must be present for the event to occur. The
former situation of alternative causation has been clarified in some
jurisdictions, so that if “multiple acts exist, each of which alone
would have been a factual cause … of the physical harm at the same
time, each act is regarded as a factual cause of the harm.”34 Accordingly, uncertainty in relation to the actual tortfeasor shifts the burden of proof onto the defendant.35
In the United Kingdom (UK), a very specific exception developed for the legal treatment of concurrent causes in the so-called
31

McGhee v. Nat’l Coal Bd. [1973] 1 WLR 1, 4, 8; Leigh v. London Ambulance
Servs. NHS Trust [2014] EWHC 286 (QB) [28].
32
See Baker v. Willoughby [1970] AC 467; McGhee v National Coal Board
[1973] 1 WLR 1; March v Stramare E & MH Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506
(Austl.).
33
So called “multiple sufficient causal sets.” The availability of evidence for the
causal explanation of the event will decide which factor or set of factors has to be
regarded as cause. See Restatement (Third) of Torts §§ 26, 420. BÜRGERLICHES
GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 830 (setting forth the rule that where several
persons participate in a course of conduct which is potentially dangerous to others,
even if not as such unlawful, all actors are liable for the full extent of the
damage.).
34
Restatement (Third) of Torts §§ 26, 452.
35
BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 830 (stating that the
defendants can be held liable jointly and severally when the identity of the actual
tortfeasor or the share of the contribution cannot be determined.). See also HR 9
oktober 1992, NJ 1994, 535 m.nt (Van Ballegooijen/Bayer Nederland BV) (Neth.)
(confirming the applicability of Article 6:99BW (Buergerlijk Wetboek) in mass
tort cases.). See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980) (market share
doctrine). See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 486 (Cal. 1988) (limited
liability to several only, not jointly, in DES cases).
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Fairchild line of cases. In these cases, a normatively modified
approach was established for every single instance of exposure to
asbestos in consecutive employments that preceded the harm and
increased its risk, even if it was not possible to prove through which
specific situation of exposure to asbestos the injury (mesothelioma)
occurred.36 This was followed by legislation to clarify that for this
specific category of asbestos exposure cases, all past employers who
contributed to the increasing risk are severally and jointly liable,
thus each of them is liable for the entire harm.37 The Fairchild
exception has not been extended into other areas so far.38
However, a further group of exceptional cases in the UK
concerns the exposure of employees to harmful substances other
than asbestos. Here, part of the amount of the harmful substance is
considered to be “allowed” and thus, labelled as “innocent,” whereas any amount above this threshold falls into the category of being
“guilty.”39 If then neither the innocent nor the guilty amount alone
are deemed as being able to cause the medical condition which the
employee suffers, but the amounts together are on the balance of
probabilities causal for the harm and thus constitute a set of conditions, it is sufficient that the “guilty” amount made a material contribution to the condition and the claimant is entitled to receive full
compensation.40
36

Fairchild, [2002] UKHL 22 (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead). This exception has
not been extended so far, Ministry of Defence v. A.B. and others [2012] UKSC 9;
Sienkiewicz v. Greif (U.K.) Ltd [2011] UKSC 10.
37
See Barker v. Corus U.K. Ltd. [2006] UKHL 20 (establishing only several
liability based on the proportion of the attributable risk.); See Compensation Act
2006, 29 § 3(2)(b) (U.K.) (making provision for joint and several liability.).
38
Jones & Ors v. The Sec’y of State for Energy & Climate Change [2012] EWHC
2936 (QB); Ministry of Defence [2010] EWCA (Civ) 1317 (dismissing appeal by
a slim majority); See also Williams v. Bermuda Hosps. Bd.[2016] UKPC 4
[hereinafter Bermuda].
39
Bonnington Castings Ltd. v. Wardlaw [1956] AC 613 (HL) (ruling that where
only part of the inhalation of dust was attributable to a breach of a duty, the
defendant will be liable on the ground that his breach of duty made a material contribution to the disease).
40
Bailey v. Ministry of Defence [2008] EWCA (Civ) 883; Bermuda; John v. Cent.
Manchester & Manchester Children’s Univ. Hosps. NHS Found. Tr. [2016]
EWHC 407 (QB); Compare Carder v. The Univ. of Exeter [2016] EWCA (Civ)
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In Canada, legislation has overcome the barrier of a strict
causal analysis in multi-stage scenarios involving concurrent causes
in tobacco litigation. For litigation relating to the recovery of healthcare costs, causation can be established on an aggregate basis and
liability is apportioned based on the market share of tobacco companies. Smoking related healthcare costs from tobacco producers can
thus be recovered on the basis of specific legislation that sets forth a
formula determining the market share and reverses the onus of
proof.41 A slightly different situation of cumulative causation arises
when concurrent causes contributed a certain proportion to the harm
which can be determined, for example when successive employers
contributed harmful substances through insufficient working conditions. English and German legal systems will hold each of them
liable in proportion to the contribution which can be measured in
intensity and duration of exposure; none of the employers is liable
for the entire harm.42
Again at a general level, the continental approach to causation is structurally similar to the common law. It introduces normative parameters for causal explanations and supplements these with
further theories on the basis of statutory provisions, such as the
theory of “adequate causation” and the theory of the protective
scope of the statutory norm.43 French law uses the equivalence
790 (confirming only negligible contribution); Compare Wilsher v. Essex Area
Health Auth. [1988] AC 1074, 1091 (HL) (assessing a case where there are other
“innocent” causes and any of these could have led to the harm).
41
Tobacco Damages Recovery Act, S.B.C. 1997, c. 41 s. 13 (Can.), amended by
SBC 1998, c. 45 (Can.), repealed by Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs
Recovery Act, SBC 2000, c. 30 s. 6 (Can.); See Martin Olszynski, et al., From
Smokes to Smokestacks: Lessons from Tobacco for the Future of Climate Change
Liability, 30 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 12 (2017).
42
Holtby v. Brigham & Cowan (Hull) Ltd. [2000] 3 ALL ER 421; McGhee v.
Nat’l Coal Bd. [1972] 3 ALL ER 1008; OTTO PALANDT, BÜRGERLICHES
GESETZBUCH § 249 (77th ed. 2018); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of
Justice] June 16, 1959, BGHZ 30, 203 (Ger.); see also GERVEN ET AL., supra note
21, at 432.
43
MÜNCHNER KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH, BAND 2 SCHULDRECHT ALLGEMEINER TEIL I § 249 (2019) [hereinafter MÜNCHNER KOMMENTAR];
CHRISTIAN VON BAR, THE COMMON EUROPEAN LAW OF TORTS: VOLUME TWO
(2000).
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theory combined with an explanatory theory for the concrete
event.44 Under the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch,
BGB), much effort has been dedicated to develop a coherent theory
of causation from a bifurcated normative perspective which views
causation as a foundation of the existence (Haftungsbegründend)
and the scope of the liability (Haftungsausfüllend).45 For causation
to be the foundation of liability, the theory of equivalence is the
starting point, but this theory is not conclusive of the extent of liability. The theory of adequate causation is used to eliminate unlikely
factors from the causal chain.46 This probability is measured ex ante,
from the perspective of an objective bystander.47 A positive formulation requires that the factor must have increased the probability of
any event of such a kind in a not only negligible fashion, for example harm that occurred following medical negligence in the treatment of an injury may still be considered as a consequence of the
cause that made the treatment necessary in the first place.48
Using normative correctives and reducing or reversing the
burden of proof, are the conventional methods of the law to soften
the outcome of causal analysis. This facilitates a re-distribution of
risk which often would not be achieved for concurrent causes on the
basis of the mechanistic “but for” or the “conditio sine qua non”
test.49 However, applying these normative considerations in specific
cases, all of them outside climate change, does not resolve the sys44

GERVEN, supra note 21, at 396.
MÜNCHNER KOMMENTAR , supra note 43, at § 249; GERVEN, supra note 21, at
396.
46
HART & HONORÉ, supra note 20, at 465.
47
MÜNCHNER KOMMENTAR, supra note 43, at § 249.
48
PALANDT, supra note 42, at § 249; The more complicated negative formula
eliminates a factor as candidate for an adequate cause for the damage if it could
produce the result in question only under particularly unique and quite improbable
circumstances to which no attention would be paid if events had followed the
normal course. A similar probabilistic element exists in the common law system,
where under the test of the ‘remoteness of damage’ the criteria for ‘reasonable
foreseeability’ assumes the perspective ex ante, Overseas Tankship v Morts Dock
Engineering (The Wagon Mound No 1) [1961] AC 388; Jolley v Sutton London
Borough Council [2000] UKHL 31.
49
MÜNCHNER KOMMENTAR, supra note 43, at 416.
45
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temic difficulties that arise from the strict causal analysis in the context of climate change. Further, it does not account for scientific
evidence forecasting the likelihood of future events based on past
occurrences of similar events (for example heat waves) and casespecific evidence. This will be demonstrated in the next section.
B. Finding the Causal Link in Climate Litigation
Climate change litigation faces many obstacles, often revolving around procedural questions of standing50 and jurisdiction,51
but also as a consequence of applying criteria of established legal
concepts—such as causation—to a new challenge.52 This is neatly
illustrated in the decision of the District Court of Essen in the case
Lluiya v. RWE.53 The claimant, a Peruvian farmer living in the
Andes, asserts that his home and livelihood are threatened by the
risk of flooding from a glacial lake outburst. The glacial lake Palcacocha is damming glacial meltwater, the water is hold by a natural
moraine (deposit of irregular mass of debris from a glacier) and
controlled by a set of basic pipes to reduce pressure. He claims from
50

Case T-330/18, Carvalho v. Parliament, 2019 E.C.R. 324 ¶ 54 (reasoning that
the applicants were not individually concerned).
51
Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Conn., 564 U.S. 410 (2011); Native Vill. of Kivalina v.
ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 858 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 569 U.S. 1000
(2013); Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010); Bundesverwaltungsgericht Nov. 27, 2018, A-2992/2017; Jacqueline Peel, Issues in
Climate Change Litigation, 1 CLIMATE CHANGE L. REV. 15, 16 (2011).
52
See Geetanjali Ganguly et al., If at First You Don’t Succeed: Suing Corporations for Climate Change, 38 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 841 (2018); Jacqueline
Peel & Jolene Lin, Transnational Climate Litigation: The Contribution of the
Global South, 113 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 679 (2019); Sophie Marjanac & Lindene
Patton, Extreme Weather Event Attribution Science and Climate Change Litigation: An Essential Step in the Causal Chain?, 36 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L.
265 (2018); Jacqueline Peel et al., Shaping the ‘Next Generation’ of Climate
Change Litigation in Australia, 41 MELB. U.L. REV. 793 (2017); Jacqueline Peel
& Hari M. Osofsky, Climate Change Litigation’s Regulatory Pathways: A
Comparative Analysis of the United States and Australia, 35 L. & POL’Y 150
(2013); Jolene Lin, Climate Change and the Courts, 32 LEGAL STUD. 35 (2012);
Brian J. Preston, Climate Change in the Courts, 36 MONASH U. L. REV. 15 (2010).
53
Landgericht Essen [District Court Essen] Dec. 15, 2016, 2 O 285/15 (Ger.).
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the German Energy provider RWE AG a pro rata financial contribution to flood protection measures in proportion to the company’s
GHG emissions on the basis of Art. 1004 of the German Civil Code
(BGB).54 The calculation of the compensation is derived from the
report on the quantified contribution of “carbon majors” to cumulative global GHG emissions.55 The report states that the company
contributed 0.47 percent to the global total.56 The Essen court held
that RWE would not qualify as a disturber of the claimant’s property
in the absence of equivalent and adequate causation.57 Applying the
strict “conditio sine qua non” test of causation, the court was not
satisfied that the contribution of RWE could be considered to be
significant given the existence of multiple other pollutants, despite
acknowledging that the company was a major emitter. However, “in
the light of the millions and billions of emitters worldwide” the
court was unable to conclude that anthropogenic climate change,
and consequently the purported flood risks of the glacial lake, would
not occur without RWE’s emissions.

54

The provision does not require that the property is located in Germany. Further,
even a party that acts lawfully may be held liable for damage caused, a legal
principle that underlies BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 1004
but also (as noted by the Hamm court) GESETZ ZUM SCHUTZ VOR SCHÄDLICHEN
UMWELTEINWIRKUNGEN DURCH LUFTVERUNREINIGUNGEN, GERÄUSCHE,
ERSCHÜTTERUNGEN UND ÄHNLICHE VORGÄNGE [BIMSCHG] [FEDERAL EMISSION
CONTROL ACT] § 14(a).
55
See Richard Heede, Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and Methane
Emissions to Fossil Fuel and Cement Producers, 1854–2010, 122 CLIMATIC
CHANGE 229 (2013) (presenting a ground-breaking quantitative analysis of the
historic fossil fuel and cement production records of fifty leading investor-owned,
thirty-one state-owned and nine nation-state producers of oil, natural gas coal, and
cement, and finding He that ninety of these ‘carbon major’ entities are responsible
for nearly two-thirds of historic carbon dioxide and methane emissions).
56
See Heede, supra note 55.
57
In German civil law, equivalent causation is the first step of the test, and the
theory of adequate causation functions as a normative corrective The theory of
adequate causation is used to eliminate unlikely factors from the causal chain; See
also PALANDT, supra note 42, at § 249.
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The appeal against this judgment is currently pending in the
second instance, the Regional Court in Hamm.58 After hearing oral
arguments, the Hamm court ordered evidence to be heard.59 Under
German procedural law, this means that the Hamm court is of the
opinion that the case is conclusively (similar to prima facie plausibly) argued60 and it is now a matter of providing scientific evidence
to answer the specific questions asked by the court.
In contrast to the Essen court, the Australian court in Gray v.
Minister for Planning reasoned that merely because the concrete
contribution of certain emissions could not be accurately measured,
this would not suggest that a causal link between the burning of coal
and the impact on the global climate was insufficient.61 The issue in
question in that case, however, was whether a sufficiently proximate
link between mining and GHG emissions, including their impact on
climate change, could be established as part of an environmental
impact assessment.62 Such a situation is different from the attribution of a concrete climate change impact to not only the amount of
global GHG emissions worldwide, but to a specific emitter as in
Lliuya. It is also different from the circumstances in Urgenda, where
The Hague District Court and The Hague Court of Appeal both
found a causal link between emission intensity and the impacts of
climate change,63 or the statement of the Supreme Court of Colom-

58

Oberlandesger Hamm [Regional Court of Hamm] Feb. 1, 2018, Rechtsprechung
Der Oberlandesgerichte in Zivilsachen [OLGZ] 15, 17 (Ger).
59
Id.
60
The court will only hear evidence if the legal argument is conclusive (Schlüssigkeitsprüfung) so that if the facts can be proven, the legal requirements of the
statutory provision are fulfilled. The court stated in the order for hearing evidence
that concerns regarding the admissibility and conclusiveness of the claim are not
justified on the basis of the current factual and legal situation.
61
Gray v. The Minister for Planning [2006] NSWLEC 720 (Austl.).
62
Id. at 100.
63
Urgenda Foundation v The State of the Netherlands C/09/456689/HA ZA 131396 (24 June 2015) ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7196 (unofficial English translation, only the Dutch text of the ruling is authoritative, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:
7145) [4.90]; The State of the Netherlands v Urgenda Foundation 200.178. 245/01
(9 Oct. 2018) ECLI:NL: GHDHA:2018:2610 (unofficial English translation) [64].
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bia when acknowledging that multiple simultaneous causes impact
the ecosystem.64
These decisions are not considering the causal link between
an individual climate related event and overall GHG emissions
worldwide or even attributing the event to a narrower group of emitters. They do, however, find a causal link between accumulated
emissions and increasing climate change impacts generally. On that
basis, the most far-reaching decision in finding a causal link between
climate related events and a concrete source of emissions is Gloucester Resources Limited v. Minister for Planning, where the New
South Wales Land and Environment Court (“NSWLEC”) posited
that there is a causal link between the planned project (a new coal
mining plant) and the project’s cumulative GHG emissions and
further climate change and its related consequences.65 Interestingly,
the court reasoned that it is sufficient that the project’s emissions
would “likely contribute to the future changes to the climate system
and impacts of climate change” and that the project was “likely to
have indirect impacts on the environment, including the climate
system.”66 Thus, the NSWLEC acknowledged a causal link in the
light of the scientific treatment of corresponding uncertainty levels.
This decision is one in an increasing number of climate litigation cases, demonstrating that systemic issues remain in the application of the “but for” test of causation, when attributing specific climate related events to global GHG emissions or concrete emitters.
The following section summarizes, on the basis of the case law discussed in the two previous sections, three systemic constraints of our
conventional approach to test causation in the climate change
context.

64

A tutela is a legal remedy to protect fundamental rights. The Supreme Court of
Justice ordered the protection of the Colombian Amazon from deforestation
through an intergenerational pact for the life. See Corte Suprema de Justicia
[C.S.J.] [Supreme Court] 5 abril 2018, STC4360-2018 (Colom.).
65
Gloucester, supra note 8, at 525.
66
Id.
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C. Three Constraints for Causal Explanations
The existing framework of causal analysis confronts a
coherent approach to causal explanations in the context of climate
change with three major constraints. The first constraint is that the
current approach couples a strict causal test with normative adjustments for some specific ex-post causal explanations, however, no
such treatment has been devised at a comprehensive level. The
harshness of the causal test is only alleviated through case-specific
normative correctives—none of these have been sufficiently elaborated in the climate change context so far,67 leaving the strict “but
for” analysis as the default position in law.
The second constraint is that the existing framework lacks
the means of reflecting scientific evidence that makes projections
about changes in probability of any future weather or climate related
events with various degrees of confidence levels. This ignores the
potential of climate science because it undermines the underlying
question of causal analysis: How could the attributed (weather or
climate) event be prevented in the future? Portraying factual causation through a counterfactual enquiry necessarily compares the existing world with a counterfactual world, where higher uncertainty is
associated with the latter. The “but for” test claims to be based on
mathematical operations yet in reality is inherently limited by what
we think would have happened in the absence of the event. This not
only presumes we can single out one specific factor but also that the

67

For the underlying role of these principles for justice consideration see JOHN
RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (Erin I. Kelly ed. 2001). This lack
of normative correctives is partly due to the fact that climate change involves a
convergence of factors which constantly threaten ethical behaviour and defy moral
standards. For a discussion of these moral dimensions, see STEPHEN M.
GARDINER, A PERFECT MORAL STORM: THE ETHICAL TRAGEDY OF CLIMATE
CHANGE (2011); STEPHEN M. GARDINER & DAVID A. WEISBACH, DEBATING
CLIMATE ETHICS (2016). Normative correctives could be developed in a similar
fashion as in the law of torts, where it is accepted that the person who suffered the
harm should be compensated.
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event in its concrete form occurred because of this factor. It pretends
certainty where always only degrees of likelihood can exist.68
A third and major constraint concerns the role of concurrent
causes. The “but for” test neglects a contributing factor as potential
cause-candidate if it is not the only necessary or sufficient factor that
is responsible for the event. The test does not provide a tool for
identifying concurrent causes that are components of a set of factors,
where only the set in its entirety is sufficient for an increased risk or
harmful event, or in a situation where only a succession of events
leads to the final result.
The following Part II briefly explains the emerging field of
probabilistic event attribution, its methods and role in climate science, including the two levels of uncertainty treatment in reporting
research results. On that basis, Part III ties law and climate science
together and proposes a new matrix for causal explanations in the
climate change context to address the three constraints.
III. PROBABILISTIC EVENT ATTRIBUTION
Causally explaining observed changes in the climate system
has been the aim of a field of climate science known as detection
and attribution since Hasselmann in 1997 developed methodologies
to attribute observed trends in global mean temperature to known
natural and anthropogenic drivers. In essence, a climate model is
used to simulate global mean temperature with and without anthropogenic GHG emissions finding that without these emissions the
observed increase (1°C today69) cannot be simulated. While traditional detection and attribution methods yield significant results only
when trends are very strong, changes in the probabilities of extreme
events are subtler and could thus not be attributed to global GHG
emissions at the time of Hasselmann when climate models were
extremely costly to run.
68

This is a persistent logical challenge in social sciences, see Max Weber, Critical
Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences, in THE METHODOLOGY OF SOCIAL
SCIENCES 113, 169–73 (Edward Shils & Henry Finch eds., 1969).
69
Karsten Haustein et al., A Real-Time Global Warming Index, 7 NATURE SCI.
REP. 1, 3 (2017).
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A. Developments in a New Field of Climate Science
Today, climate science can determine that the Argentina
heatwave in 2013–2014 was made five times more likely due to
total anthropogenic emissions and the European Union’s emissions
account for an increase of thirty seven percent in the likelihood of
this heat wave occurring.70 Rapid analyses are used to produce
results immediately after an extreme event has occurred, for example to explain that the 2018 heatwave in Northern Europe was made
at least twice to five times more likely to occur in many places
because of climate change.71
With the increased availability of large ensembles of climate
models, a different field of detection and attribution has emerged:
probabilistic event attribution. While differences in the methodology
exist,72 the main aim of this science is to answer the question whether
and to what extent anthropogenic climate change has altered the
likelihood and intensity of an individual extreme weather event to
occur. Using climate modelling and statistical modelling, scientists
estimate the probability of an event to occur with climate change
(“P1”) and in a counterfactual climate of a world without anthropogenic GHG emissions (“P0”), thus causally linking the occurrence
probability of severe weather events to external drivers of the climate
system.73 On that basis, it is then possible to quantitatively determine
even the contribution of individual countries to the changing like-

70

Otto et al., supra note 3, at 757.
Heatwave in Northern Europe, Summer 2018, WORLD WEATHER ATTRIBUTION
(July 28, 2018), https://www.worldweatherattribution.org/attribution-of-the-2018heat-in-northern-europe/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2020).
72
Friederike E.L. Otto et al., The Attribution Question, 6 NATURE CLIMATE
CHANGE 813, 814 (2016). See Michael E. Mann et al., Assessing Climate Change
Impacts on Extreme Weather Events: The Case for an Alternative (Bayesian)
Approach, 144 CLIMATE CHANGE 131 (2017).
73
See A. Hannart et al., Causal Counterfactual Theory for the Attribution of
Weather and Climate Related Events, 97 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 99
(2016) (discussing the use of the Baynes’ theorem in science); see Pearl, supra
note 4; see Perry, supra note 4.
71
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lihood of certain extreme weather events as a result of these countries’ emissions.74
Results of event attribution studies are expressed in risk
ratios (“RR”), calculated as the ratio between the probability of an
event to occur in today’s climate (“P1”) and an unchanged climate
(“P0”), describing the change in occurrence frequency of the event
caused by anthropogenic climate change.
RR=P1/P0
Risk ratios are given with confidence intervals representing
sampling and methodological uncertainties.75 The causal statement
thus entails the identification of a cause, such as increasing emissions, and represents a causal quantity in the shape of the attributable risks.76 The design and framing of the attribution study is
essential for the interpretation and any further use of results that it
delivers.77 In particular, the definition of the event that is studied is
crucial. For example, defining the heatwave of 2018 as a European
temperature average over the whole season June to August will
result in risk ratios that are much higher compared to a more
localized and impact focused definition like maximum heat stress in
a city.78
A further significant differentiation is made between the
types of events that are examined. While the Arctic heatwave in
December 2016 was made more than 1000 percent more likely due
to anthropogenic GHG emissions with contributions of the European Union and the United States alone doubling the risk, the rainfall event in the United Kingdom during January 2014 was made
74

Otto et al., supra note 3, at 757, 758.
See Sjoukje Philip et al., Attribution Analysis of the Ethiopian Drought of 2015,
31 J. CLIMATE 2465 (2018).
76
Pearl, supra note 4, at 307.
77
See Friederike E.L. Otto et al., Attribution of Extreme Weather Events in Africa:
A Preliminary Exploration of the Science and Policy Implications, 132 CLIMATIC
CHANGE 531 (2015).
78
See also Luke J. Harrington & Friederike E.L. Otto, Adapting Attribution Science to the Climate Extremes of Tomorrow, 13 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 123006
(2018).
75
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forty percent more likely by total GHG emissions and only three
percent more likely as a result of European Union GHG emissions.79
It is also important to highlight that there are extreme events that are
made less likely by anthropogenic climate change while for others
the risk is unchanged even in a changing climate and, crucially there
are events for which current methods and tools are not advanced
enough to estimate the change in risk.80
While for a number of studied events and variables the climate change signal81 is relatively linear with global mean temperature
increase, this is not always the case. A linear pattern has been found
to exist for some regional climate change impacts; for others a quasiexponential increase or a sigmoidal pattern of change exists.82 This
means that defining a causal relation between GHG emissions and a
specific impact depends very strongly on the type of event, the region
in the world and temporal and spatial scales of the studied event.
A crucial implication of the development of probabilistic
event attribution is that it cannot be applied only after an event has
happened and damage occurred. When vulnerabilities and thresholds
are known, changing risks can be calculated ex ante. In other words,
the changing risks can be forecasted. The improvement of the methods allows geographically very specific events to be anticipated and
thus, appropriate adaptation measures can be designed.83
B. Uncertainty Treatment in Probabilistic Event Attribution
There are two levels where uncertainty treatment plays a role.
First, the probability concerning the causal link itself, for example,
79

See also Harrington & Otto, supra note 78.
Friederike E.L. Otto et al., Attributing High-Impact Extreme Events Across
Timescales—A Case Study of Four Different Types of Events, 149 CLIMATIC
CHANGE 399, 412 (2018).
81
Climate signals are long-term trends and projections that are linked to climate
change. Examples are rising sea levels, increasing extreme precipitation, and
warming sea surface temperatures.
82
See Luke J. Harrington & Friederike E.L. Otto, Attributable Damage Liability in
a Non-Linear Climate,153 CLIMATIC CHANGE 15 (2019).
83
We thank Lindene Patton for stressing this point and the fact that with the ability
to forecast, there comes a duty to do so.
80
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the anthropogenic GHG forcing increased the likelihood of intense
rainfall as measured in the wake of hurricane Harvey that hit Houston, Texas in August 2017 by a factor of 1.5 to five times.84 Second,
the confidence level that is attached to this statement; given that
climate models are known to be not unbiased in representing hurricanes and only one other independent study with similar findings
exists, the confidence in this statement (on Hurricane Harvey) is only
medium.85
These two levels of uncertainty are independent of whether a
projected (ex-ante) or attributed (ex-post) change in the occurrence
frequency of an extreme event is large or small. For example, we
have high confidence that anthropogenic climate change increased
the likelihood of extreme precipitation in UK winters by forty percent (likely range 0–100%) while we have medium confidence that
the 2015–2017 drought in Cape Town was made three times more
likely (likely range factor 1.4 to 6.4).86 The likelihood statements
result from statistical analyses of climate data whereas the levels of
confidence depend on the climatic variables (temperature, precipitation, pressure, etcetera) analysed, availability and quality of observed
84

Geert Jan Oldenborgh et al., Attribution of Extreme Rainfall from Hurricane
Harvey, August 2017, 12 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 12124009 (2017).
85
The confidence level reflects the evaluation of the validity of a finding.
Generally, evidence is most robust when there are multiple, consistent and independent sources of high-quality evidence. A level of confidence is expressed using
five qualifiers: very low, low, medium, high, and very high. It synthesises the scientific judgment about the validity of findings as determined through evaluation of
evidence and agreement. Likelihood provides calibrated language for describing
quantified uncertainty. It can be used to express a probabilistic estimate of the
occurrence of a single event or of an outcome (e.g. a climate parameter, observed
trend, or projected change lying in a given range). Likelihood may be based on
statistical or modelling analyses, elicitation of expert views, or other quantitative
analyses. The range is as follows: Virtually certain: 99-100% probability, Very
likely: 90–100% probability, Likely: 66–100% probability, About as likely as not:
33–66% probability, Unlikely: 0–33% probability, Very unlikely: 0–10% probability, Exceptionally unlikely: 0–1% probability. See MICHAEL D. MASTRANDREA
ET AL., GUIDANCE NOTE FOR LEAD AUTHORS OF THE IPCC FIFTH ASSESSMENT
REPORT ON CONSISTENT TREATMENT OF UNCERTAINTIES, 3 (2010).
86
Friederike E.L. Otto et al., Anthropogenic Influence on the Drivers of the
Western Cape Drought 2015–2017, 13 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1240010 (2018).
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data, strength of theory describing and understanding processes in
the climate system, reliability of climate models and the availability
of evidence (number of scientific studies as well as number of independent data sources).
How can the increase in risk for which probabilistic event
attribution provides the evidence be captured in a standardised causal
law? If there are other cumulative factors that contributed to an event
and increase the likelihood of the future occurrence of similar events
of this kind, but none of the factors passes the traditional threshold
set by the “but for” test, is it possible to find a causal explanation?
Intuitively, the answer might be positive, however, a more rigorous
structural causal law exists and this will be developed in the following part.
C. Three Pillars for Analysis in a New Matrix on Causation
The following part develops a model that addresses the three
constraints of the conventional test of causation as discussed in Part
I, making use of probabilistic event attribution as introduced in Part
II. The model is based on Pearl’s explanation of his theory of causation, which is grounded in logical elaborations of the notions of
“necessary” and “sufficient” conditions and complemented by “sustenance” as a final element. The model comprises three pillars.
The first pillar is derived from the logical elaborations of the
notions of “necessary” and “sufficient” conditions,87 which already
underlie the legal concept of causation, to identify relevant factors of
the causal chain. The strength of the causal connection between
these factors is then determined on the basis of the degrees of probability and the confidence levels with which scientific results are
reported for each of these factors.88 The transitivity theory is applied
as a mathematical tool to reflect the logical consequences that the
87

JOHN L. MACKIE, THE CEMENT OF THE UNIVERSE: A STUDY OF CAUSATION 160
(1980); TONY HONORÉ, RESPONSIBILITY AND FAULT 94 (1999).
88
Reflecting the idea that an event is caused by all conditions, see John L. Mackie,
Causes and Conditions, in CAUSATION 35 (Ernest Sosa & Michael Tooley eds.,
1993); PHYLLIS ILLARI & FEDERICA RUSSO, CAUSALITY: PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY
MEETS SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE 29 (2014); MILL, supra note 24, at 367, 373.

2019-20]

CLIMATE CHANGE AND CAUSATION

73

existence and the related strength of a causal link across factors in a
multi-stage scenario entails.
The second pillar accounts for climate science, including
probabilistic event attribution, to demonstrate that higher amounts of
GHG emissions increase the intensity and frequency of climate
related events. We introduce the notion of the distinctive causal field
to capture this strong connection where sufficient event-specific evidence for a plurality of types of events exists.
The third pillar supplements the existing logical fundamentals with the notion of “sustenance” to offer a coherent approach to
causal explanations in the climate change context that includes concurrent causes. Probabilistic event attribution is used to explicate the
fraction of the attributable risk for a cause that is at least a concurrent cause.
i. Necessary and Sufficient Causation
A causal relation between different factors and the degree of
confidence that allows concluding from one factor to the existence
of another, are regularly established using the criteria of “necessity”
and “sufficiency.” This reasoning already forms the basis of our
legal concept. It is concerned with providing proof at every stage of
the structural chain of events that the premises imply a certain conclusion.89
The following explains causation as a fundamental logical
concept, based on the relation between two factors, we call them at
this stage “N” and “S.” S is a sufficient condition for N if it is true if
there is S, we know that there is also N. It is possible to say that S
implies N, or whenever there is S, then N is also true. That does not
imply that N will only be true if there is S: N may also occur in the
absence of S, where another factor leads to N. However, S cannot be
true without N being present, because N is necessary for S. If we
89

MENDELSON, supra note 11, at 2; Jan Dul, Necessary Condition Analysis
(NCA): Logic and Methodology of “Necessary but Not Sufficient” Causality 16
ORGANIZATIONAL RES. METHODS 10, 16 (2016); Bear F. Braumoeller & Gary
Goertz, The Methodology of Necessary Conditions, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 844, 846
(2000).
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could establish that N will only be true in the case if S is present, we
could conclude that N and S are equivalent conditions, where both
are sufficient and necessary for each other at the same time. Such an
equivalent relation between N and S indicates a very strong causal
connection.
The law does not always explicitly discuss necessity and sufficiency and it does not require an equivalent relation to establish the
“actual cause.” However, the counterfactual “but for” test reflects
the strong influence of the necessity element to establish causation
in law and consideration to the sufficiency element is given in cases
where one main factor lead to the event in question.90 Causal claims
on the basis of necessary and sufficient conditions can be made in
varying shades, depending on the evidence that is available. High
levels of confidence and event-specific evidence explicate a strong
causal connection between two factors.91
In returning to our climate change context, we now establish
the causal connection on the basis of these two existing logical fundamentals, between the following four factors that climate scientists
identify in the multi-stage scenario of anthropogenic climate change:
“E,” “T,” “IF,” and “IS”. These will be explained in turn. E denotes
the quantity of anthropogenic GHG emissions.92 T stands for the
increase of global mean surface temperature. IF captures the impacts
of a changing climate consisting of a general tendency of increasing
frequency and severity of some weather events and (climate related)
slow onset events. IS denotes the occurrence of a concrete climate
change impact, either a severe weather event or a slow onset event.
If there is to be a causal link between a concrete climate
impact IS (for instance severe flooding, a specific heatwave or a
hurricane) and E, explaining the relations between and E and T,
between T and IF and E and IF are key steps for the investigation
whether IS could have been anticipated (and thus avoided) and we
90

HART & HONORÉ, supra note 20, at 109; James J. Edelmann, Unnecessary
Causation, 89 AUSTL. L.J. 1 (2015).
91
PEARL, supra note 4, at 311.
92
E can be defined as the global total or narrower, only including specific
emitters, see PAUL GRIFFIN, THE CARBON MAJORS DATABASE: CDP CARBON
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proceed with this before turning to the direct link between E and IS,
for which attribution science can now also provide the scientific
evidence.
Further, a binary relation over a set of factors can generally
be qualified as a transitive composition of binary variables, if a
chainlike process exists where it is true that “X causes Y and Y
causes Z regardless of X, it can be concluded that X causes Z.”93
From our understanding of processes in the atmosphere, observational analyses and climate modelling, we know that the occurrence
of extraordinary global-scale heat waves, some extreme precipitation events,94 droughts and storms in some areas,95 cannot be
explained without human-induced climate change.96 These impacts
of climate change IF, allow us to identify E as cause for IF where
there is a transitive relationship between E, T, and IF. If the relation
between E and T and T and IF is transitive that means that E is also
and in the same way related to IF. To put it differently, this establishes a causal link between GHG emissions and the general
increase in frequency and severity in climate change impacts. Transitivity also maintains the strength of the causal relation over the
entire set of factors.
Consequently, if we establish a causal relation between an
increase of E and the increase in T and the increase in T and increasing frequency and severity of climate change impacts IF, a causal
relation between the increase of E and IF can also be determined.
Depending on the strength of the causal explanation (the level of
confidence), this thus allows us to anticipate IS where IS a narrower
defined event comprised within IF. The following part ties in the
93
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scientific evidence between E, T and IF before then taking a closer
look at the relation between E and IS.
There is sufficient scientific evidence that the present
increase in T would not have happened without the increase in E97
and more than ninety seven percent of actively publishing climate
scientists agree.98 The evidence for the relation between E and T has
grown further in the last decade and the confidence level is expressed
as virtually certain for the human influence as the dominant cause of
the observed warming since the mid-twentieth century.99 Cumulative
total GHG emissions and the response of T are approximately
linearly related.100 The contribution of E to the increase in T was
likely to be in the range of 0.5°C to 1.3°C during the period 1951 to
2010 and is approximately 1°C today.101
This means that between the increase in E and the increasing
T exists even an equivalent relation. Both are necessary and sufficient conditions for one another. Increasing E is a necessary condition of the increase of T since 1880. T would not have occurred
without E and E is also a sufficient condition for T, because this
very concrete temperature increase is a consequence of E. No other
factor explains the increase in T.
Scientific evidence further shows that an increase of T
implies the occurrence of some more intense and more frequent
severe weather events and slow onset events.102 There has been fur97
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ther strengthening of the evidence for human influence on the frequency and intensity of daily temperature extremes since the midtwentieth century, and it is very likely that a human induced increase
in average mean temperatures has more than doubled the probability
of occurrence of heat waves in some locations.103 Changes in many
extreme weather and climate events have been observed since about
1950.104 Slow onset events, such as glacial retreat, can be measured
globally and over the last two decades, the Greenland and Antarctic
ice sheets have been losing mass, glaciers have continued to shrink,
and Arctic sea ice and Northern Hemisphere spring snow cover have
continued to decrease in extent (high confidence).105
Up to this point, a strong causal connection can be demonstrated in the form of equivalent causation between E and T and
between T and IF as a general trend, or expected consequence,
which means that E and IF are also both, necessary and sufficient
conditions in accordance with the transitivity theory. It is correct to
say that E implies IF, E and IF display an equivalent relation and thus
a very strong causal connection.
ii. Distinctive Causal Field
We introduce the notion distinctive causal field to capture
this strong connection between E and IF, where IF is the general
trend of extreme weather and climate related events for which sufficient event-specific evidence for a plurality of similar climate events
(for example heat waves) exists. The term causal field was first
introduced by Anderson and revived by Mackie to explain that all
causal claims are made in a certain context, for instance against the
scale 6. It is likely that the frequency of heat waves has increased in large parts of
Europe, Asia and Australia. See IPCC 2014, supra note 99, at 5. See also Noah S.
Diffenbaugh et al., Quantifying the Influence of Global Warming on Unprecedented Extreme Climate Events 114 PNAS 4881 (2017).
103
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over the Historical Record, 14 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 123006 (2019).
104
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background of certain theories or a set of facts which are considered
to be common, in order to identify the one factor that was different
from the causal field on a particular occasion.106 The term distinctive
causal field is used here in a slightly modified version, influenced
by the view of Lewis on events that share a common causal history,107 to describe the general context of expected events within
which causation of a single climate related impact is examined.
In addition to using the causal explanation between E, T and
IF to understand the likelihood of IS as just demonstrated, the causal
link between E and IS can now be established directly using probabilistic event attribution. Thus, changes in E lead directly to impacts
as well as via the increased T and the direct link between E and IS can
be observed and measured in accordance with this new scientific
evidence. These impacts concern changes in the likelihood and intensity of extreme weather events, such as heat waves in large parts of
Europe, Asia and Australia and an increased frequency or intensity of
heavy precipitation events in North America and Europe.
Further impacts include slow onset events such as changes in
Northern Hemisphere March-April (spring) average snow cover; the
reduction of the extent of Arctic July-August-September (summer)
average sea ice with average temperature anomalies exceeding
widely 2°C and 3°C in places;108 changes in global mean upper
ocean (0–700 meters) and global mean sea level rise.109 The next
section accounts for this new scientific evidence in the specific
relation between E and IS. It introduces the notion of sustenance to
portray E as “concurrent cause” for IS in law.
iii. INUS Condition, NESS Condition, Sustenance
The scientific evidence that establishes an equivalent relation
between E and IF encompasses a strong causal connection for all
events that form part of the distinctive causal field. The existence of
this distinctive causal field is important for assessing future risks
106
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using climate modelling and socioeconomic scenarios110 and for the
anticipation of structurally similar events. In addition, as discussed,
attribution science identifies E as a cause-candidate in climate
modelling for impacts IS where E is directly linked to IS. But if E is
only part of a set of other factors and not the dominant cause, the
law lacks the capacity to respond to these scientific findings. Thus,
how can the increase in risk for which probabilistic event attribution
provides the evidence, be captured in a standardized causal law, for
example to explain causation in our case Lluiya v. RWE?
In the literature on formal logic, a variety of concepts have
been discussed to find a structural causal law that accounts for concurrent causes in multi-stage scenarios. Mackie contended that a
cause is at a minimum an “Insufficient, but Non-redundant part of
an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition,” he calls this an “INUS”
condition.111 His explanation of “cause” reflects Mill’s idea of
defining the cause as “the sum of the total of the conditions positive
and negative.”112 Mackie’s famous example is that even though an
electrical short-circuit causes a fire, it is an insufficient condition on
its own, because other conditions such as oxygen are needed in addition, it is non-redundant, because in this concrete instance it produced the spark. A fire can start without electrical short-circuit, it is
thus unnecessary, but the whole set of conditions on this occasion
was sufficient to start the fire.
Assuming that E is insufficient for a concrete IS, for instance
a tropical cyclone, E could still be an insufficient but non-redundant
part of an unnecessary condition which is in its entirety sufficient on
this occasion—cyclones have happened in the absence of E—but for
a concrete occurrence of a particular cyclone, E could participate as
part or of the sufficient condition.
In Lliuya, if E would only qualify as part of a set of sufficient conditions, it could entail that E does not pass the test for
equivalent or “but for” causation, even if it increases the risk, as was
the result of the causal analysis of the Essen court. The influence of
110
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the causal risk factor E depends on the prevalence of complementary
causes in a set that together represents the sufficient cause.113 In the
current framework of causal analysis, as demonstrated by the Essen
court, a strict test does not reflect the contribution of the concurrent
cause. Only ex post, that is if the risk materializes, could normative
parameters (if available and applicable) be used to portray that IS (in
the example a glacial lake outburst) was partially caused by E.
Conversely, the INUS condition provides a minimum threshold for causation, which so far has been occupied solely by the
requirement of the cause being a necessary or sufficient condition
under the “but for” veil which creates the need for further normative
corrections as discussed above. Should INUS conditions be included
in developing legally meaningful explanations in the context of
climate change impacts? An earlier attempt to translate INUS conditions into a legal threshold was undertaken by Wright who diagnosed an urgent need of repair of causation in the law of torts and
developed the Necessary Element of a Sufficiency Set (“NESS”)
test. Like the INUS test, the NESS test subordinates the necessity
element under the sufficiency element of causation.114 It offers a
better explanation than the “but for” test, however, sharing the same
ontological framework as Mackie’s INUS condition means that the
NESS test is susceptible to the same criticism.115
Pearl agrees with the tests set forth by INUS and NESS in so
far as he claims that the sufficiency component should be given
additional weight in law as it draws the attention to the consequences of one’s action.116 At the same time, he confronts Mackie’s
INUS condition and its NESS relative with strong criticism, which
is echoed by others in the discourse on formal logic. The major flaw
that Pearl identifies is that it is impossible, without further limita113
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tions, to extrapolate from INUS and NESS conditions a structuralcausal law that distinguishes between formulae that represent stable
mechanisms and those that represent circumstantial conditions.117 If
such a standard logical syntax cannot be derived from INUS or
NESS conditions, he argues that no causal law allowing for causal
generalization can exist.
Jaegwon Kim—known for his research on the metaphysics
of causation—proposes a way to resolve this shortcoming.118 He
calls for entities that possess both, an element of generality and an
element of particularity; the former is necessary for making sense of
the relations of necessity and sufficiency, and the latter for making
sense of singular causal judgments. In the specific situation of
climate change, this could be applied by comparing the ex ante causal explanation (forecast or projection) with the ex post causal explanation (attribution). Or to be more concrete, to focus on those events
where the impacts that occurred, instantiate specific impacts IS that
qualitatively follow our expectation and forecast for IF.
However, that would on the one hand limit the causal analysis to cases where the risk indeed has materialized and harm is suffered (and thus further entertain a bifurcated conceptual approach to
causation) and on the other hand also exclude cases where no projections are available for IS despite the existence of IF and the fact
that the event in question represents a structurally similar instantiation of this distinctive causal field.
Pearl resolves the problem by adding a further component
which ties in with the counterfactual approach. Following on from
what Hall calls dependence (similar to necessity) and production
(close to sufficiency), Pearl introduces the notion of sustenance to
supplement the counterfactual analysis.119 Sustenance measures the
capacity of the cause to protect or maintain the effect under structural changes in the model.120 It translates the idea of Lewis on
117
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“quasi dependence” into a syntax where contingencies are modified
to test the resulting effect and thus, the ability of the factor to sustain
it.121 Pearl translates the causal law into a mathematical formula:
“W” is in the following a set of variables which form part of
a climate model, and let “w,” “w’” be specific realizations of these
variables. The set of variable represents our (modelled) world u. We
say that x causally sustains y in u relative to contingencies W = w,
w’ if and only if
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

X(u) = x;
Y(u) = y;
Yxw(u) = y for all w; and
Yx’w’(u) = y’ ≠ y for some x’ ≠ x and some w’.

The sustenance feature is represented in (iii). It means that x
will maintain y even if we set W to any value w. (iv) explains that
only x will sustain y. Thus, if we change x to x’, then Y will relinquish the current value y (we could also say the effect will change),
for at least one setting of W = w’. 122
We define as follows:
x=E,
Y=IS
W= a set of conditions, with w being variables of the set
U=our (modelled) world.
E is a cause if it will sustain IS even if w will change. For
instance, the fraction of the risk that is attributable to GHG emissions for the risk of flooding remains stable in proportion to the
amount of GHG emissions, even if conditions (w) of the model are
changed, such as improving flood protection measures. While the
overall risk of flooding may change, the proportion of this risk that
is produced by E remains the same. Only if we change E, for
121
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instance lower emissions, then there will be at least one set of conditions where IS will change (the risk of flooding decreases).
This formula reflects the modelling used in probabilistic
event attribution, where the divergence between counterfactual
worlds and the actual world are simulated by changing contingency
factors, such as changing emissions to measure the effect on the
climate and the occurrence of climate related events. It can also be
used in law, since it is based on logical fundamentals to which our
legal concept can adapt. The reasoning based on necessity and sufficiency is extended by a further factor which accounts for a concurrent cause that produces the effect without being necessary or sufficient on its own.
A structural analysis using all three elements for the analysis
can thus supply causal information derived from climate models. In
our example case Lluiya, the first step is to establish the causal link
between E and IF, in this case the concentration of GHG emissions in
the atmosphere and the general increase in frequency and intensity
of glacial ice loss. E can be identified as part of the component factors and the contribution to the risk can be quantified, based on the
knowledge of the impact of E on glaciers within IF, climate modelling and additional case-particularistic information.123 A specific
model could then be chosen to establish further case-particularistic
evidence for the relation between E and IS. Here, E may be one
factor that forms part of a set of factors that cause the immediate
risk, and if E is producing the proportional increase in risk for
variations of other factors it is true to say that E sustains IS. Further,
only E will sustain IS if a change of E (defined as a change from x to
x’ in step iv) will change our event IS for at least one setting of conditions (w) in the climate model. The causal statement will at every
stage include a reference to the fraction of the attributable risk for IS
and the confidence levels that is attached to the scientific evidence.
Thus, much will depend on the availability of scientific evidence
123
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and the strength of this data varies for different climate related
events and regions.
The advantage of the here presented formula is that this
causal account does not stipulate an entire new counterfactual world
in which no climate impacts exist. Conversely, it asserts that it is
possible to structurally change some factors of the world which constitutes the model, and to see if the studied climate event is still
maintained. This limits the counterfactual analysis to certain factors
and the knowledge about the real world—and the type-level impacts
that constitute the distinctive causal field can be used for the modelling. Sustenance establishes causation even if the anthropogenic
increase in GHG concentrations represent only a (potentially small)
part of a set of conditions.
In a further and final step, E can then be more narrowly
defined as only the European Union’s GHG emissions or the emissions of a major carbon emitter. On that basis, the concrete contribution of (a more narrowly defined) E can be quantified. The calculated fraction of the attributable climate risk to the defined emitter can
be articulated in law: it is at least a concurrent cause.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has used elementary tools of formal logic to
build a novel matrix of causally explaining the relation between
GHG emissions and climate change impacts. We offer an approach
that allows making causal statements in law about the physical reality of climate phenomena, side by side with probabilistic evidence
that defines the relations between factors and events of our changing
climate.
There is robust evidence that an equivalent causal relationship exists between the increase in GHG emissions due to the burning of fossil fuels and the increase in severity and frequency of
certain severe weather and climate related events. These events
constitute a distinctive causal field. In addition to that, the property
of sustenance is key to portraying the cause-quality of the anthropogenic emissions factor in a multistage scenario with several causes
forming a set of conditions, where the mechanistic “but for” or
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“conditio sine qua non” tests would fail in finding a cause even
though a factor contributed to the event; a situation for which casespecific normative correctives have not yet been developed. The
novel matrix is thus based on necessity, sufficiency and sustenance.
We have demonstrated that based on this extended logical
causal analysis, the concept of causation in law is compatible with
scientific uncertainties and the complexity of anthropogenic climate
change. Our approach of opening a seemingly strict causal test to
include sustenance as a further analytical property, is based on the
observation that normative correctives influence the identification of
the “actual cause” in other areas of law; in fact, pragmatic judicial
reasoning surrounds the quest for causal explanations. Indeed, concentrating on causation as a pre-determined rigid concept is one of
the greatest impediments for the legal response to climate change
and law’s capacity to use scientific evidence. It limits options on
adaptation and risk preparedness,124 and it reduces the adjudicative
capacity of courts.125
Conversely, identifying legally meaningful causal explanations has several implications. It contributes, but is not limited, to
building the adjudicative capacity of courts challenged by climate
litigation. It also has a much wider impact for the potential of
developing a “duty of care” of GHG emitters and influencing future
legal developments under the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement. Given
that sufficient data will not be available for all climate related events
and risks and those data are particularly limited in the most vulnerable countries, leaving causal explanations to be tested in courts
alone raises ethical concerns such as equal access to justice. Thus,
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the legal-political realm might be well advised to utilize causal
explanations de lege ferenda.

